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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case under Utah Code 
§ 78A-3-102. The Supreme Court is authorized to transfer this appeal to the Court of 
Appeals under Utah Code § 78A-3-102(4). The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the district court erred when it granted Defendants' motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds of claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion without waiting for full briefing on the motion. The issue 
was not raised before the district court, and Appellant Branson has stated no ground for 
review of the issue not preserved in the district court. "A trial court's grant or denial of a 
motion to dismiss 'is a question of law . . . [the court] reviewfs] for correctness, giving no 
deference to the decision of the trial court.'" State v. Arave, 2011 UT 84, f24, 268 P.3d 
163 (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 17, 
70P.3d 111). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about August 8, 2005, Brunson obtained the one million dollar Loan to fund 
the purchase of real property located at 14772 South Golden Leaf Court in Draper, Utah 
(the "Property"). [See Order Denying Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Dismissing Case with Prejudice entered by Judge Paul Maughan on August 13, 2010 
1 
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(hereinafter, the "Maughan Order," a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, at 2, 
11-] 
Branson failed to fulfill his payment obligations under the terms of the Loan. 
ReconTrust as trustee of the Trust Deed securing the Loan began non-judicial foreclosure 
efforts during the first few months of 2009. [Maughan Order at 2, % 2.] 
On June 8, 2009, Branson initiated a lawsuit (the "First Lawsuit") before the 
Honorable John Paul Kennedy in the Third District Court, Case No. 090909512, by filing 
his Verified Complaint against Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. ("Countrywide") and 
ReconTrust. Countrywide is the servicer of the Loan, and ReconTrust is the trustee of the 
Trust Deed securing the Loan. [Maughan Order at 2, *[[ 3.] 
Countrywide and ReconTrust responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss Branson's 
Verified Complaint in the First Lawsuit. Branson quickly amended his Complaint by 
filing a Verified Amended Complaint on or about July 2, 2009. Countrywide and 
ReconTrust filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Verified Complaint (the "First 
Lawsuit Motion to Dismiss") on July 22, 2009. The First Lawsuit Motion to Dismiss was 
fully briefed. [Maughan Order at 3, ffif 4-7.] 
On September 8, 2009, a hearing was held (the "First Lawsuit Hearing") before 
Judge John Paul Kennedy, in which the Court heard arguments concerning the First 
Lawsuit Motion to Dismiss. [Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs 
Amended Verified Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) ("Kennedy Order"), attached as 
Exhibit B.I 
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On September 21, 2009, Judge Kennedy entered a final order granting the First 
Lawsuit Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. [Kennedy Order.] 
Brunson filed a Notice of Appeal on September 21, 2009, and on December 17, 
2009, the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed Brunson's appeal in the First Lawsuit. See 
Brunson v. Recontrust Co., N.A., 2009 UT App 381. And on January 12, 2010, the Court 
of Appeals also denied a petition for rehearing. 
Brunson then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which the Supreme Court 
denied on April 22, 2010. See Brunson v. Reconstruct, 230 P.3d 127, 2010 Utah LEXIS 
90 (Utah, 2010). 
In the First Lawsuit, among other things, Brunson (1) pled a cause of action 
against the defendants for "wrongful foreclosure," (2) made allegations that the 
defendants were foreclosing a Trust Deed that was allegedly "void," (3) made allegations 
that the Loan was securitized and sold for more than the aggregate amount without giving 
Brunson any excess funds and alleged that the securitization of the Loan caused him 
damage, and (4) alleged that the defendants should repay him the sum of $352,190.30. 
[Maughan Order at 4, ^j 13-16.] 
Brunson filed the current lawsuit on July 20, 2010 (the "Instant Action" or 
"Second Lawsuit") by filing his Verified Complaint in the Third District Court, Case No. 
100913085. [Maughan Order at 4, f 17.] 
In the Instant Action, Brunson alleges causes of action against the defendants for 
"wrongful foreclosure" of the same Loan and same Property. [Maughan Order at 4, | 
18.] 
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In the Instant Action, Brunson alleges causes of action against defendants for 
damages in the identical amount of $352,190.30, as alleged in the First Lawsuit. 
[Maughan Order at 4, ^ 19.] 
In the Instant Action, Brunson alleges that the Trust Deed is "void" through the 
securitization of the subject Loan, as he did in the First Lawsuit. [Maughan Order at 5, f^ 
20.] Like the First Lawsuit, in the Instant Action, Brunson seeks an order declaring that 
the Trust Deed is "not a lien" against the Property. [Maughan Order at 5, % 23.] The 
Instant Action, as well as the First Lawsuit, pertains to the same Loan, the same Property, 
the same foreclosure, the same Trust Deed, and the same remedies sought for by Brunson 
against the named defendants. [Maughan Order at 5, f 24.] 
Countrywide is the servicer of the Loan. BNY is the beneficiary of the Trust 
Deed, and ReconTrust is the Trustee of the Trust Deed. [Maughan Order at 5, f^ 25.] 
Brunson was instructed by Judge Kennedy in the First Lawsuit that the allegations and 
causes of actions filed by Brunson were frivolous. Nonetheless, Brunson chose to file the 
Instant Action, once again seeking the remedy of "wrongful foreclosure, among other 
things." [Maughan Order at 5,^26.] 
In response to Brunson's Verified Complaint in the Instant Action, the Defendants 
filed a motion to dismiss (the "Instant Action Motion to Dismiss") arguing, among other 
things, that Brunson5 s claims are barred by issue and claim preclusion. The 
memorandum in support of the Instant Action Motion to Dismiss also served as an 
opposition memorandum to Brunson's TRO Motion. 
4 
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A hearing (the "Instant Action Hearing") on the TRO Motion was held before 
Judge Paul G. Maughan on July 27, 2010. A full and complete transcript (hereinafter, the 
"Instant Action Hearing Transcript") of the Instant Action Hearing is attached as Exhibit 
C. 
At the Instant Action Hearing, Brunson was given the opportunity to present 
arguments in support of the TRO Motion and also in opposition to the Instant Action 
Motion to Dismiss. [See generally the Instant Action Hearing Transcript.] Judge 
Maughan also told Brunson that the Instant Action is "frivolous," denied the TRO 
Motion, dismissed the Instant Action with prejudice, and awarded attorneys fees to the 
Defendants. [Instant Action Hearing Transcript at 15-16.] 
On August 13, 2010, Judge Maughan entered the Maughan Order denying the 
TRO Motion, finding that the Instant Action is frivolous and that Brunson's claims are 
barred by issue and claim preclusion, granting the Motion to Dismiss, dismissing the 
Instant Action with prejudice, awarding attorneys fees to the Defendants, and 
admonishing Brunson not to re-file this case. [Maughan Order at 5, ff 27-29, and 6, ^ 
1-4.] 
Brunson next attempted to have this matter heard on appeal by filing with the 
Supreme Court, on or about August 24, 2010, the following two documents, styled as 
follows: (1) a Petition for Extraordinary Writ in Support of Rule 8A and Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities (the "Writ Petition") and (2) a Verified Petition for Emergency 
Relief Under Rule 8 A (the "Verified Petition") (the Writ Petition and the Verified 
Petition will sometimes collectively be referred to herein as the "Petitions"). The matter 
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was assigned appellate case number 20100689 and was eventually assigned to the Court 
of Appeals. 
On September 3, 2010, the Court of Appeals entered an order (the "Petitions 
Order") denying the Petitions. A copy of the Petitions Order is attached hereto as Exhibit 
D. Brunson then filed an appeal (appellate case number 20100752) which was dismissed 
by this Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction. See Brunson v. Bank ofN. Y. Mellon, 
2010 UT App 354, 2010 Utah App. LEXIS 366. 
This appeal followed. 
& 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Brunson does not contest the substantive dismissal of his claims. Rather, Brunson 
merely argues that the district court heard and decided the Instant Motion to Dismiss 
prior to Brunson filing a written memorandum in response. This is not reversible error. 
The trial court is entitled to manage its cases and docket in the fashion it deems most 
expeditious. No error occurred, but even if it did any such error was harmless as Brunson 
does not in any way contest the outcome. Moreover, Brunson had already received his 
full measure of due process when he previously litigated to completion in the First 
Lawsuit the claims repleaded in the Instant Action. The district court gave Brunson a full 
opportunity to address the substance of the motion to dismiss—i.e. that it was barred by 
res judicata and collateral estoppel—which is more than sufficient procedural due process 
under the circumstances. 
ARGUMENT 
This lawsuit centers on Appellant Brunson's second of three attempts to assert 
baseless claims in an effort to stop Appellee The Bank of New York Mellon ("BNY") 
from foreclosing on its collateral, the subject property. This particular case was filed by 
Brunson on July 20, 2010, along with a motion for a temporary restraining order 
("TRO"). Six days later BNY and ReconTrust Company ("ReconTrust") filed a 
combined opposition to the TRO and motion to dismiss. At the TRO hearing the very 
next day and after hearing Brunson's arguments, the Court denied the TRO and granted 
the motion to dismiss. Brunson filed an objection to the proposed order of dismissal on 
August 4, 2010, and the Court entered the order on August 13, 2010. Brunson filed a 
7 
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Petition for an Extraordinary Writ (Appellate Case 20100689) on August 30, 2010, 
seeking to vacate the order. That Petition was transferred to this Court of Appeals which 
denied the Petition on September 10, 2010. Unsatisfied, Brunson filed a Notice of 
Appeal on September 13, 2010. That appeal (Appellate Case 20100752) was poured over 
to this Court of Appeals and was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the underlying 
order was not final. As it turns out, the case was still outstanding as to Green Tree 
Servicing, LLC ("Green Tree"). Eventually, Brunson obtained a default against Green 
Tree, and Green Tree, in turn, moved to vacate the default and dismiss the case. While 
briefing was in process on that motion, Brunson filed the instant notice of appeal on 
September 14, 2011. The motion to vacate the default and dismiss the lawsuit as to 
Green Tree was granted and a final order entered on March 28, 2012. 
This lawsuit was preceded by a lawsuit in the Third Judicial District Court 
entitled Devon Brunson v. ReconTrust Company, N.A. et al, Case No. 090909512 (the 
"First Lawsuit5'). That lawsuit related to the exact same foreclosure of the exact same 
subject property. The First Lawsuit was filed June 8, 2009 and was dismissed by Judge 
Kennedy on September 21, 2009. Brunson filed a Notice of Appeal on September 22, 
2009 (Appellate Case 20090833) (the "First Appeal"). The appeal was poured over to 
this Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal on December 21, 2009. Brunson 
filed a writ of Certiorari on or about January 25, 2010 (Appellate Case 20100112-SC), 
which was denied on April 28, 2010. 
Despite having had his day in court, including appellate review of the trial court's 
decision, Brunson was unhappy with the result. Consequently, he filed this lawsuit (the 
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"Second Lawsuit"). After the dismissal of this lawsuit, Brunson found himself unhappy 
with the result and, therefore, filed a third lawsuit entitled Devon Brunson v. American 
Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. et al, Case No. 110915040 in Third Judicial District 
Court (the "Third Lawsuit"). That lawsuit also related, in part, to the exact same 
foreclosure of the exact same subject property. The Third Lawsuit was dismissed on 
November 17, 2011 on the same ground as the lawsuit underlying this appeal—claim and 
issue preclusion based on the disposition of the First Lawsuit. A motion for 
reconsideration was denied on April 12, 2012. No appeal has yet been filed in that case. 
Brunson argues that the district court committed error when it decided BNY and 
ReconTrust's motion to dismiss prior to full briefing. However, nowhere in his briefing 
does Brunson argue that he was harmed or prejudiced by the district court's failure to do 
so. 
Under Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or 
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage 
of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 61. In other words, this rule requires Brunson not only to demonstrate a 
"technical violation" of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but also demonstrate that the 
technical violation harmed his substantive rights or resulted in prejudice. 
Q 
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Although not previously addressed by Utah Appellate Courts with respect to a 
Rule 12 motion to dismiss, a review of Utah law relating to other dispositive motions 
such as summary judgment motions, confirms that prejudice is a necessary element to 
prevailing on appeal. There a numerous examples of the Utah Supreme Court affirming 
summary judgment granted without "strict compliance to the rules" where "both parties 
[were] present and no prejudice [was] shown." Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 
(Utah 1993); see also Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 61-
62, 504 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972) (affirming summary judgment despite technical violation 
in timing of hearing); Security Title Co. v. Pay less Builders Supply, 17 Utah 2d 179, 180 
(Utah 1965) (affirming grant of oral summary judgment motion at the end of a pretrial 
hearing in a foreclosure action without providing any opportunity to respond in writing). 
In Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), the trial 
court held a hearing on a motion for summary judgment four calendar days (but only one 
business day) after it was filed and before any opposition briefing had taken place. See 
id. at 796. Despite the finding a teclinical violation of Rule 56(c), which required at least 
ten days notice before a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. In doing so, the Supreme Court held that a 
"technical violation" of the Rules relating to timing does "not divest the court of 
jurisdiction over the motion . . . . [h]owever, such a violation will void the grant unless 
the violation amounts to harmless error"" Id. (emphasis added). Stated affirmatively, a 
"technical violation" of the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to summary judgment 
motion practice, which like a motion to dismiss is dispositive, does not divest the Court 
10 
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of the ability to grant the motion, but at best will subject the motion to reversal if the 
error is not harmless. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991). 
Here, Brunson does not even argue that the outcome was wrong, that he was 
prejudiced, or that more time and briefing would have resulted in a different outcome. 
Nor can he. Whether described as "prejudice" or "harmful error" the analysis is the same 
- was the trial court correct on the law? It was. 
In the context of a motion to dismiss, where there are no facts at issue, the only 
question is whether the trial court was correct in its application of the law. The trial court 
carefully and clearly laid out in its order the elements of claim preclusion and correctly 
found that they were all met. See Maughan Order passim. Indeed, even Brunson has 
conceded that his arguments sound "novel, ridiculous, or frivolous." See Docketing 
Statement, September 30, 2010 at p. 5. Accordingly, there was no reason for the trial 
court to delay further, and no ten day period or written memorandum would have 
changed the outcome.1 See State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22 at ^ 20, 20 P.3d 888 ("Harmless 
error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that it affected the outcome of the proceedings."). Accordingly, no reversible error was 
committed and this court should affirm the district court's ruling. 
Additionally, Brunson was not denied any procedural due process rights. To the 
contrary, at the hearing, the Court gave Brunson an opportunity to be heard, address the 
11 
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motion to dismiss, and distinguish his claims in the Instant Case from the claims that had 
previously been dismissed in the First Lawsuit, which he could not do. This is all the 
procedural due process that should be accorded to Brunson under the circumstances. See 
Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996) (noting that "[s]tate courts are 
generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common 
issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes" and that only "extreme applications of the 
doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is 'fundamental in 
character'" such as due process). 
Each of the claims asserted in the Instant Action had been previously litigated to 
completion in the First Action, wherein Brunson received his full measure of due process. 
The very purpose of claim preclusion is to "bar[] a party from prosecuting in a 
subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated previously." Culbertson v. Bd. of 
County Comm 'rs, 2001 UT 108 at f^ 13. "Preclusion advances judicial economy by 
preventing the unnecessary relitigation of claims and issues. " Brigham Young Univ. v. 
Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19 at f^ 28; see also Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 
2003 UT 13 at |^ 33 ("The doctrine of res judicata serves the important policy of 
preventing previously litigated issues from being relitigated."). Since a party has already 
received his full measure of due process with respect to claims previously litigated to 
completion, the due process clause is only implicated "when the party sought to be 
The fact that the outcome would not have changed given additional time or briefing is 
apparent also from the fact that the Third Lawsuit, which asserted the same claims 
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precluded [by application of res judicata] was not an actual party in the first lawsuit." 
Brigham Young, 2005 UT 19 at ^ 28 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Richards, 517 U.S. at 797 n. 4 (noting that the requirement of due process is implicated 
only when courts "give a conclusive effect to a prior judgment against one who is neither 
a party nor in privity with a party therein."). 
In the Instant Action, Brunson is the exact same party that participated in the First 
Lawsuit. As such, he has already had participated in our "deep-rooted historic tradition 
that everyone should have his day in court." Richards, 517 U.S. at 797. As a 
consequence, Brunson is not entitled to any additional procedural due process relating to 
the claims litigated in the First Lawsuit and the Instant Action, and the district court did 
not violate those non-existent rights by declining to extend a second day in court. See 
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 348 (1948) ("It is clear that Respondent was afforded 
his day in court with respect to every issue involved in the litigation . . . . Under such 
circumstances, there is nothing in the concept of due process which demands that a 
defendant be afforded a second opportunity to litigate . . . . " ) . 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court was legally correct in dismissing Brunson5s case, any 
technical error was clearly harmless or not prejudicial, the trial court should be affirmed. 
Additionally, BNY and ReconTrust request an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant 
to Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure insofar as the district court 
relating to the same foreclosure and the same property, was likewise dismissed with 
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determined that the Instant Action was frivolous, so too is this appeal. See also Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2012. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
Mfctefel D. Black 
Rita M. Cornish 
Attorneys for Appellees 
prejudice on the bases of claim and issue preclusion. 
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ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2005-58 
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH 
CERTIFICATES; SERIES 2005-58, and 
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., and 
GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC and 
JOHN DOES OF UNKNOWN NUMBER, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 100913085 
Judge Paul Maughan 
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This matter came on for hearing on July 27, 2010, at 11:00 a.m. before the Court, the 
Honorable Paul G, Maughan, for consideration of plaintiff Deron Bnmson's ("Brunson") Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") against defendants The Bank of New York Mellon 
fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders CWalt, Inc., Alternative Loan 
Trust 2005-58 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates; Series 2005-58, ("BNY") and ReconTrust 
Company, N.A. ("ReconTrust") (collectively referred to as "Defendants"). Brunson appeared 
pro se and Defendants were represented by Darren K. Nelson of the law firm of Parr Brown Gee 
& Loveless, 
The Court having heard the oral argument of the parties, having folly and carefully 
reviewed the file, including the pleadings filed in Case No. 090909512, Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the Honorable John Paul Kennedy, and having 
stated the Court's findings, conclusions and ruling on the record, the Court finds as follows: 
1. On or about August 8,2005, Brunson obtained a loan in the principal amount of 
one million dollars (the "Loan) to fund the purchase of a home located at 14772 South Golden 
Leaf Ct, Draper, Utah (the "Property"). 
2. Brunson failed to fulfill his payment obligations under the terms of the Loan. 
ReconTrust as trustee of the Trust Deed securing the Loan began non-judicial foreclosure efforts 
during the first few months of 2009. 
3. Brunson filed a lawsuit m Third District Court, Case No, 090909512 (the 
"Concluded Lawsuit"), by filing his Verified Complaint on or about June 8, 2009, against 
345650.1 
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Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. ("Countrywide") and ReconTrust. Countrywide is the servicer 
of the Loan, and ReconTrust is the trustee of the Trust Deed securing the Loan. 
4. Countrywide aud ReconTrust responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss Brunson's 
Verified Complaint, in the Concluded Lawsuit. 
5. Branson quickly amended his Complaint by filing a Verified Amended Complaint 
on or about July 2, 2009. Countrywide and ReconTrust filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Verified Complaint on July 22, 2009. 
6. Brunson filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on July 28, 
2009. 
7. On August 7,2009, Countrywide and ReconTrust filed a Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss. 
8. On September 8,2009, a hearing was held (the "Hearing") before Judge John 
Paul Kennedy, in which the Court heard arguments concerning the Motion to Dismiss. 
9. On September 21,2009, Judge Kennedy entered a final order (the "Final Order") 
granting the Motion to Dismiss. 
10. Brunson filed a Notice of Appeal on September 21,2009, 
11. On December 17,2009, the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed Brunson's appeal in 
the Concluded Lawsuit. 
12. Brunson filed a Writ of Certiorari, The Utah Supreme Court denied Brunson's 
Petition for Writ Certiorari on April 22,2010. 
345650,1 
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13. In the Concluded Lawsuit, Brunson pled a cause of action against the defendants 
for "wrongful foreclosure/1 
14. In the Concluded Lawsuit, Brunson made allegations that the defendants were 
foreclosing a Trust Deed that was allegedly "void." 
15. In the Concluded Lawsuit, Brunson made allegations that the Loan was 
securitized and sold for more than the aggregate amount without giving Brunson any excess 
funds. Brunson alleged that the securitization of the Loan caused him damage. 
16. In the Concluded Lawsuit, Brunson alleged that the defendants should repay him 
the sum of $352,19030. 
17. Brunson filed this lawsuit on July 20,2010 (the "Instant Action")* 
18. In the Instant Action, Brunson alleges causes of action against the defendants for 
"wrongful foreclosure" of the same Loan and same Property. 
19. In the Instant Action, Brunson alleges causes of action against defendants for 
damages in the identical amount of $352,190.30, as alleged in the Concluded Lawsuit. 
20. In the Instant Action, Brunson alleges that the Trust Deed is "void" through the 
securitization of the subject Loan, as he did in the Coneluded Lawsuit. 
21. In the Instant Action, Brunson alleges that the "Substitution of Trustee is not 
dated, signed or notarized." Despite Plaintiffs verified allegation, the Substitution of Trustee 
provided to the Court is notarized, and recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
22. In the Instant Action, Plaintiff alleges that the Notice of Default and Election to 
Sell is neither signed nor notarized. However, the Notice of Default and Election to Sell 
4 
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provided to the Court shows that the subject document was recorded in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office and acknowledged appropriately. 
23. Like the Concluded Lawsuit, in the Instant Action, Plaintiff seeks an order from 
this Court declaring that the Trust Deed is "not a lien" against the Property. 
24. The Instant Action, as well as the Concluded Lawsuit, pertains to the same Loan, 
the same Property, the same foreclosure, the same Trust Deed, and the same remedies sought for 
by Brunson against the named defendants, 
25. Countrywide is the servicer of the Loan, BNY is the beneficiary of the Trust 
Deed, and ReconTrust is the Trustee of the Trust Deed. 
26. Brunson was instructed by Judge Kennedy in the Concluded Lawsuit that the 
allegations and causes of actions filed by Brunson were frivolous. Nonetheless, Brunson chose 
to file the Instant Action, once again seeking the remedy of "wrongful foreclosure, among other 
things." 
27. Brunson has failed to meet his burden of establishing a TRO pursuant to Rule 
65(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
28. The Court finds that the Instant Action is barred by both claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion, as argued by the defendants, 
29. The Court finds that the Instant Action is frivolous, without merit, and not 
brought in good faith pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825, 
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
5 
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1. Branson's Motion for TRO is DENIED; 
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, and this case shall be dismissed, with 
prejudice on the merits; 
3. Defendants are awarded reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $2,944.00 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. 
4. Plaintiff is ordered not re re-file this case anew. 
Dated this _ / > . day of mjf, 2010. 
BY THE COURT; 
6 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^0 day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE was served via United States first class 
mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Deron Brunson 
138 East 12300 S.#C 196 
Draper, UT 84020 
Pro Se 
U: 11. <1M» 
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HfcED mSTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 2 J 2009 * 
Qy. 
SALT UKGCOUt S-
oop«tycio»k 
Order prepared and submitted by: 
Damn K. Nelson (7946) 
John P, Snow (10735) 
PARR BROWN GBB & LOVELESS 
185 South State St., Suite 8GQ 
Salt Ulce City* Utah 84i l l 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: ($01) 532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendants ReconTrust Company, N.A. and 
Countrywide Homo Loans, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND POR SALT LAKB COUNTY, STATE O? UTAH . 
DERON BRUNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs< 
RBCONTRUST COMPANY, N.A. and 
COUNTRYWJDB HOME LOANS, INC., 
and JANE AND JOHN DOB does 1-40, 
Defendaats, 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS 
AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6) 
Case No, 090909512 
Judge Kennedy 
The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Verified Complaint Pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) (the "Motion") filed by Defendants ReeonTrust Company, N.A. and Countrywide 
Home Loansj Inc. (collectively, "Defendants") oame on for hearing cm Tuesday, September 8, 
2009, at 1:30 p.m. before the Honorable John Paul Kennedy, Third District Judgs, Appearances 
were noted in the record of tha heaving, v/ith Deron Brunson.C'Plaintiff1) appearingywo se, and 
John 1\ Snov/ appearing on behalf of Defendants, 
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( 
Having reviewed the Motion, Defendants' memorandum and reply memorandum in . 
support thereof, and Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition thereto, mid having heard the 
arguments presented at the hearing on the Motlon,-and for other good md sufficient cause, the 
Court agrees with find adopts the reasoning set forth in Defendants* briefing on the Motion, and 
therefore hereby; 
ORDERS that Defendants' Motion be; and hereby k> GRANTED. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs Amended Verified Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice in its entirety, 
. DATED this ^ , day of ^jps ~ > 2009, 
BY THB COURT: 
i(J?abiHohn?a 
Thiidpistrtc* Judge, State oH^t ' Jg$ 
Approved as to form: 
Deron Bnhison 
Plaintiffprv se 
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CERTIFIED COPY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
DERON BRUNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, 
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, 
INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN 
TRUST, RECONSTRUCT COMPANY, 
GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC, 
and JOHN DOES OF UNKNOWN 
NUMBER, 
Defendants. ) 
-0O0-
Case No. 100913085 
HEARING FOR TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of July, 2010, 
commencing at the hour of 11:00 a.m., the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE PAUL G. 
MAUGHAN, sitting as Judge in. the above-named Court for the 
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were 
had. 
. -oOo-
333 SOUTH RIO GRANDE 
SALT L A K E CrrYt UTAH 84101 
WWW.DEPOMAXMERIT.COM 
EPOMAXMERnr 
g g f a s r f LITIGATION SERVICES 
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FAX 801 -328-1189 
A * T h A i - M n r \ r i ^^rr* f~\\ I A 1 r*T"V 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: DERON BRUNSON 
Appearing Pro Se 
For the Defendants; DARREN K. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
Parr, Brov/n, Gee & Loveless 
185 South State Street, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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1 
2 P R Q C S E D I N G S 
3 
4 (Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
5 
6 may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
7 
8
 a THE COURT: All right, Deron Brunson vs. York 
9 Mellon, et al. 
10 This is case ending in 3085. And Mr* Brunson is 
11 present' and you, sir? 
12 MR. NELSON: I'm sorry, your Honor. Mr. Darren 
13 Nelson, Parr, Brown, Gee & Loveless, on behalf of the 
14 defendants except for Green Street. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. How did you--why are you here, 
16 Mr. Nelson? 
17 MR. NELSON: I?m here because we were alerted Friday 
18 of a TR—or excuse me, of a complaint that had been filed by 
19 Mr. Brunson. 
20 THE COURT: And how did you— 
21 MR. NELSON: W e — 
22 THE COURT: How were you alerted? You're welcome. 
23 I'm just wondering why, 'cause I have no notice that you were 
24 going to be here, other than what you've--
25 MR. NELSON: We sub—we submitted some material--
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1 THE COURT: Right. 
2 MR. NELSON: —yesterday. 
3 ' THE COURT: Right. 
4 MR. NELSON: We were notified because Recontrust 
5 was— 
6 THE COURT: Had been given a copy o f — 
7 MR. NELSON: Had been given a copy of—of the 
8 material. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 - M R . NELSON: We—we kind of monitor this stuff in 
11 our office, to be honest with you. They—they retained us 
12 Friday afternoon and w e — I — I prepared some material 
13 yesterday. 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MR, NELSON: We--this—as your Honor is aware, w e — 
16 we've been litigating with Mr. Brunson for awhile* 
17 THE COURT: Yeah. 1 am. Okay. 
18 Mr. Brunson, why shouldn't 1 just dismiss this out 
19 of hand and-~and find you in violation of Rule 11 and 
20 sanction? 
21 MR. BRUNSON: Has the Court read my~-
22 THE COURT: I've read it. 
23 MR. BRUNSON: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: I've read the file. 
25 MR. BRUNSON: Okay. As you know, I'm pro se and so 
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1 I read the rules. ItTs my impression that— 
2 THE COURT: If you've read the rules, answer my 
3 question. 
4 MR. BRUNSON: Because they didn't follow the rules 
5 when they follow—when they tried to foreclose on my property. 
6 THE COURT: In what way? 
7 MR. BRUNSON: If you'll go to some of the exhibits, 
8 the—:the notice of-trustee has not been signed, has not been 
9 notarized. The—the other documents that do the foreclosure 
10 haven't been notarized or signed. According t o — 
11 THE COURT: Hasn't all this been litigated before? 
12 MR, BRUNSON: No. No. This is—I felt I had the 
13 right to establish new claims. I'm suing the Bank* of New York 
14 whom I had not — 
15 THE COURT: Well, what was changed between now and 
16 when Judge Kennedy and the Court of Appeals and the Supreme 
17 Court kinda pushed your case aside? What's changed? 
18 MR. BRUNSON: My causes of action. In my other 
19 complaint, I alleged for a breach of contract and—and I 
20 alleged a couple of other things. It's my understanding that 
21 when I found that there was other--see, what I'm alleging now 
22 is, who are the owners of my note in order which to foreclose? 
23 The information that— 
24 THE COURT: And why do you care? Have you paid 
25 them? Have you paid anybody? 
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1 MR. BRUNSON: I have, to a certain degree, yes. 
2 ' THE COURT: Are you current? 
' 3 MR. BRUNSON: No. I'm not. 
4 THE COURT: You're in default? 
5 MR. BRUNSON: I'm in default. So, because— 
6 THE COURT: So, why do you care then? 
7
 r MR. BRUNSON: Well, because as—as they are a 
8 .* servicing agent and they are servicing a loan and if the loan 
9 has been paid off or if the individuals that own the note, 
10 they could come after me and say, hey- -
11 THE COURT: They're coming after you right now. 
12 MR. BRUNSON: They're not the owners of the note. 
13 The articles that they've given to me say that they are 
14 servicing the note, but it doesn't say that they own the note. 
15 And the note, as I've alleged in my complaint, has been 
16 securitized, which means it's been sold for the aggregate 
17 amount, which is more than—v/hich is for the full 30 years of 
18 the loan. 
19 THE COURT: So? 
20 MR. BRUNSON: So, the question I asked myself, well, 
21 who—who are the owners of the note? Legally, can these guys 
22 enforce the note that they don't own? If—if the owners of 
23 the note — if the lav/ is correct and the only one that can 
24 enforce the note is those who hold the note, then I v/ant to 
25 know who the owners are. I want them to tell me who the 
6 
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1 owners are. 
2 THE COURT: So, who do you get your—your past due 
3 notices from? 
4 MR. BRUNSON: Servicing of the mortgage, but they're 
5 not the owners of the note, so, I ask myself the question; 
6 what— 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MR. BRUNSON: --what is the law here? It is--
9 THE COURT: The law is, it says you have to pay your 
10 mortgage. 
.11 MR. BRUNSON: Well, the lav; says that persons 
12 entitled to enforce an instrument means the holder of the 
13 instrument. So, I look at this and I go, is this true? And 
14 this is Utah Statutes, Code 78-3-301 and it says persons 
15 entitled to enforce an instrument means the holder of the 
16 instrument, it can't be a servicing agent. A non-holder in a 
17 position of the instrument has the rights of a holder or a 
18 person not in a position of the instrument who is entitled to 
19 enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 78-3— 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. BRUNSON: — 3 0 9 . 
22 THE COURT: All right. I s — 
23 MR. BRUNSON: S o — 
24 THE COURT: — i s that your argument then? 
25 MR. BRUNSON: One more thing. So, if—if—so, if 
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1 this is the lav/ and if they have to show that they own the 
2 note, let them show that they own the note. I'm asking, if 
3 they own the note, then let them come forward. If they don't 
4 own the note, then—then let the ones who own the note come 
5 forward* 
6 And I think the evidence will show in the case that 
7 they don't own the note, that they've been paid off and 
8 whatever payments I'm going to make to them- is going to—is 
9 going to be unjust enrichment, unless the owners of the note 
10 be here--
11 THE COURT: Well, did you pay off the note? 
12 MR. BRUNSON: No, your Honor, I have not. S o — 
13 THE COURT: So, you're standing here saying you Tre— 
14 how far behind are you? 
15 MR. BRUNSON: I—I don't know; two years. 
16 THE COURT: So, you haven't paid on your obligation, 
17 your note, your contract, your mortgage that you signed and 
18 said you would for two years? And now you're standing here 
19 saying what? 
20 MR. BRUNSON: Now, I'm standing here saying, if you 
21 want to enforce the note, show me who the—who owns the note? 
22 Did you sell my note? 
23 THE COURT: Well, why don't you—why don't you leave 
24 the house and go find something you can afford and--
25 • MR. BRUNSON: Because I want to know who owns the 
8 
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1 note, I think, i f — 
2 THE COURT: You have no right to be in the house, do 
3 you?-
4 MR. BRUNSON: I—I think 1 do, because they— 
5 THE COURT: Because why? You haven't paid anything. 
6 Why would— 
7 MR. BRUNSON: Because— 
8 THE 'COURT: Why do you think you can stay in a house 
9 and ignore your legal obligation and—and have a right to do 
10 that? I mean, what -
11 MR. BRUNSON: Because they satisfied the note when 
12 they—when they— 
13 THE COURT: Who satisfied the note? 
14 MR. BRUNSON: The—the originators of the note, when 
15 they had it illegally secured tightly— 
16 THE COURT: Oh. 
17 MR. BRUNSON: —when they put it o n — 
18 THE COURT: Oh. Okay. 
19 MR. BRUNSON: I would like to produce the evidence 
20 that shows that they—they will be (inaudible) and also, I 
21 think they collect insurance, al—they've already collected 
22 when you know— 
23 THE COURT: Did you pay insurance? 
2 4 MR. BRUNSON: They have™ 
25 THE COURT: Did you pay insurance? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. BRUNSON: I paid--
THE COURT: Did you pay insurance? 
MR. BRUNSON: Some—what type of insurance, your 
Honor? Yes. I have paid insurance. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's — 
MR, BRUNSON: And property taxes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's hear from Mr. Nelson. 
MR. NELSON: Your Honor, this—this lawsuit involves 
the same property, the same loan, the same allegation of 
wrongful foreclosure and the same parties or the same privity 
of parties. The only difference between this and what we've 
done with Judge Kennedy, all the way up to the Supreme Court, 
that was just on a remittitur two months ago, is that he's now 
added the trust—or excuse me, the beneficiary of the trust 
deed and deleted Countrywide Home Loans as a servicer of the 
loan; but it is the same, again, the same underlying 
transaction and the same operative facts wherein ultimately, 
M S the Court can read both—both complaints, the Amended 
Verified before Judge Kennedy and the Verified Complaint 
before your Honor. The end result, the prayer for relief is 
the same: You, Recontrust, which is the same in both—both 
lawsuits, cannot foreclose this because the deed, the trust 
deed is void or it's invalid. 
Now, the legal theory with the securitization of the 
note here and whether Recontrust can foreclose because it is 
10 
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1 or is not a national bank, which is something that's been 
2 litigated numerous times in—in Federal Court recently, it—it 
3 has changed just a little bit, but—but the real question is 
4 as it's promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court is whether that 
5 issue or whether that claim for—for a wrongful foreclosure is 
6 precluded under the res judicata, the principle which is a 
7 subset--which--and a subset of claim preclusion of issue 
8 preclusion. 
9 The Utah Supreme Court in O'Maughan, which we've 
10 cited, has indicated that where two causes of action embody 
11 the same dispositive issue, a prior determination of that 
12 issue in the context of one cause of action has preclusive 
13 effect in the later litigation regarding the other cause of 
14 action and prevents the re-litigation of issues that have been 
15 once litigated and determined in another action, even though 
16 the claims for relief in the two actions may be different. 
17 I think it's enlightening a little bit to — to look 
18 at what Mr. Brunson's argument was before Judge Kennedy. 
19 Judge Kennedy asked him many of these same questions and he 
20 said, I'm—Mr. Brunson: I'm pursuing—and this is on Page 36 
21 of Page—of Exhibit H, which was the hearing transcript in 
22 Exhibit 1. "I'm pursuing this action because I believe they 
23 devalued my property, I believe that they devalued my money, I 
24 believe that I've been injured strongly in that way because I 
25 have more than just this property, I believe that the banking 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 industry totally destroyed every—my hard work." 
2 The Court: (Judge Kennedy on Line 21:) "Okay. 
3 Now, what did they do then with respect to this property, this 
4 piece of property that you alleged in your claim that caused 
5 this problem to you? 
6 "Mr. Brunson: They securitized my loan." It's on 
7 Line 24. "They sold the loan documents, then they made money 
8 on it." 
9 He brought all of this stuff up on securitization in 
10 the other lawsuit. Judge Kennedy asked him why he didn't get 
11 a lawyer, he—this is one of several cases and one of several 
12 parcels of property Mr. Brunson said--or excuse me, has, and 
13 has filed lawsuits on. 
14 On Page 40, beginning at Line 2, Judge Kennedy said: 
15 "I would just caution you again"--or "caution you, Mr. 
16 Brunson, yourre going to end up spending a lot of money on 
17 legal fees that are somebody else's legal fees rather than 
18 your own. 1 can't tell you that you've been taught—that 
19 you've talked to the right lawyers, there are a lot of very 
20 good, very honest, capable lawyers in town that could set you 
21 straight on this matter. It seems to me and I think the 
22 advice that you've been--that you—you got as you described it 
23 from the lawyer that you talked to, namely, you borrowed 
24 - money, pay it back, is probably very good advice. If you 
25 can't pay it back, there's a—that's a different problem and 
12 
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1 maybe you need to talk to some lawyer about that: What do I 
2 do when I can't pay it back? What option do 1 have, besides 
3 filing a frivolous lawsuit in court, which this is, in my 
4 opinion." 
5 The lawsuit hasn't changed, your Honor. All he's 
6 done is, he's gone all the way up to the Supreme Court on one, 
7 the notice has been—the sale has been re-noticed and he's now 
8 come—fabricated under' the ambut of securitization formally by 
9 adding the trustee, but under the—the clear lav/ of the cases 
10 that we cited in our opposition, that is clearly precluded for 
11 claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to respond, Mr. 
13 Brunson, to that argument? 
14 MR. BRUNSON: Well, the question I ask myself which 
15 seems to be prevalent even in a case of--of enjoined Paul 
16 Kennedy is, if you take out a loan, you default, you owe, the 
17 laws, the rules, anything in regards to that doesnrt matter. 
18 I—I didn!t know that. I thought that the Rules of Civil 
19 Procedure superseded a contract. I thought—and that's what 
20 I'm learning, Ifm learning that—that if I hide behind the law 
21 to protect my rights which I find are given in the law, and 
22 if, because Irve defaulted on the loan, if the Court is able 
23 to strip me of those rights, then it would seem, in my logical 
24 following, that plaintiff is now hiding behind the court. And 
25 I'm under the impression that if I invoke lav;, then it was up 
13 
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1 to plaintiff to preempt that law and that the Court would look 
2 at the law and see if the lav/ applied or not. I've only been 
3 guided by the lav/, I have not lied, I have not been 
4 dishonest, 
5 If I look at the lav/ and it says, in order to 
6 enforce a note, you must be the owner of the note, that's what 
7 I've been guided by, your Honor, so, let's find out who the 
8 owner is. If the law says that when you foreclose, the 
9 documents have to be notarized and signed, that—that's what 
10 irm guided by, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. BRUNSON: That—that's all I have, but if the 
13 law and the rules donft apply and if this Court would be 
14 merciful with me and say, listen, this is how the Court's 
15 going to look at it, you pay a loan or give up, I withdraw. I 
16 just didn't know. But my—my whole impression this whole time 
17 if the Rules of Civil Procedure are important, the rules and 
18 statutes are the lav/, they guide who can foreclose, they guide 
19 who owns the note, thatfs all I followed, your Honor. 
20 So, I come—I throw myself at the mercy of the Court 
21 and beg for its forgiveness. If that's how the Court is going 
22 to look at it. that it's the rules, the lav/s that I have 
23 looked on, that Ifve done an immense amount of research, that 
24 I've studied, if these laws do not apply, then what—what can 
25 I say? So, I~~I will, if the Court will grant me mercy, Ifll-
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1 -I'll withdraw. 
2 THE COURT: The Court's not in the business of 
3 mercy. I'm sorry. It!s following of lav;. And the Court 
4 finds that you have not met your burden for a restraining 
5 order and I'm not going to impose it. 
6 You have been prior-^you've been instructed on prior 
7 occasions by various courts, but most recently, apparently, 
8 Judge Kennedy, who's told you that when you have a money 
9 obligation, you have an obligation to pay it back. When you 
10 don't pay it back, there might be some other remedies. He*s 
11 encouraged you to get an attorney. He's advised you against 
12 filing frivolous lawsuits. 
13 It appears to this Court that you've disregarded all 
14 of that advice and yet filed another lav/suit. You have not, 
15 at least, obtained—retained an attorney, at least one's not 
16 here, I don't know if you consulted with one, and you filed 
17 what appears to be a virtual, an albeit identical lawsuit that 
18 was dismissed by Judge Kennedy. This case is going to be 
19 dismissed as well and youTre advised not to file again. You 
20 can't file again, a case that has already been ruled, it's res 
21 judicata on both counts, as Mr. Nelson has pointed out. 
22 So, Mr. Nelson, will you prepare the appropriate 
23 order? 
2 4 MR. NELSON: Yes, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Anything else that you're requesting? 
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1 No. Mr. Nelson, anything else? 
2 MR. BRUNSON: Not that I ~ 
3 MR, NELSON: Your Honor, we would request, on the 
4 basis that—that this is a frivolous lawsuit, we would request 
5 that attorney's fees be awarded against Mr. Brunson and in 
6 favor of my client, 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Do you have an amount or 
8 affidavit? 
9 MR. NELSON: I would be happy to submit an affidavit 
10 on that. 
11 THE COURT: All right. The Court will also grant 
12 attorney's fees for filing this frivolous lawsuit. 
13 If you'll prepare the appropriate order. 
14 Court's in recess. 
15 MR. NELSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
16 (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
17 
18 * * * 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TRANSCRIBER/S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss, 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings; that I received the electronically 
recorded files of the within matter and have transcribed the 
same into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, to the best of 
my ability, constitute a full, true and correct transcription, 
except where' it is indicated the Electronically Recorded Court 
Proceedings were inaudible. 
Dated this lA * day of v HA I v\ , 2010 
Toni Frye, Transcriber 
I, RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
transcript, prepared by Toni Frye was transcribed under my 
supervision and direction. 
n 
c::fS(AUt J&. Renee L. Stacy, C RPR 
My Commission Expires % «CGSM tfcsa? fssem raw s=*w ^ Notary Public 
RENEE L. STACY 
2242 East Summerwood Dffro 
Uyton, Utah 84040 
My Commission Expires 
November 9,2011 
State of Utah _ 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
BLED 
ELUTECC 
SEP 03 2010 
Deron Brunson, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
The Bank of New York Mellon 
fka The Bank of New York, as 
Trustee for the 
Certificateholders 
CWALT, Inc.; Alternative Loan 
Trust 2005-58 Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 
2005-58/ Recontrust Company, 
N.A.; Green Tree Servicing, 
LLC; and John Does of unknown 
number, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20100689-CA 
Before Judges Davis, Roth, and Christiansen. 
This matter is before the court on Deron BrunsonTs petition 
for extraordinary relief filed pursuant to rules 8A and 19 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
A petition for extraordinary relief may be granted only 
"where no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is available," 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). The Utah Supreme Court recently 
reaffirmed that before an appellate court can address the merits 
of a petition for extraordinary relief, "the petitioning party 
must have 'exhaust[ed] all available avenues of appeal." See 
Friends of Great Salt Lake v. Utah Dep't of Natural Res., 2010 UT 
20, 5 23, 230 P.3d 1014. A petition for extraordinary relief may 
not be utilized as a substitute for an appeal. See State v. 
Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
The record indicates that on August 18, 2010, the district 
court dismissed Brunson1s action and awarded Respondents attorney 
fees for being forced to defend Brunson's frivolous action. 
Brunson has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in that he 
may elect to appeal the district court's dismissal of his 
lawsuit. Because Brunson has not exhausted his available Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on September 3, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC 
C/0 CT CORP 
136 E S TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE'CITY UT 84111 
DERON BRUNSON 
138 E 12300 S #C 19-6 
DRAPER UT 8402 0 ' 
DARREN K. NELSON 
MICHAEL D. BLACK 
JOHN P SNOW 
•PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 S STATE STE 800 
PO BOX 11019 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 -
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: MARINA DAVIS & SUSAN NORBY 
450 S STATE ST BX 1860 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this September 3, 2010. . 
Judicial A^si-stant 
Case No. 20100689 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 100913085 
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